Arizona Attorney General Investigation & Finding

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Office of the Attorney General ·

Child Support Services Section

Phone; (602) 542-9978

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From:Freitas, Rachel (ACF) [rachel.freltas@acf.hhs.gov]

Sent:Monday. June 15, 2015 1:46 PM

To: Brlght, Todd, A; Lekan, Scott; Tanner, Debra

CC: Wing,. Elise (ACF); Kenner,Charles (ACF); Hurst, Sheri, D; Patty, Janice, R

Subject:Strobel Rosier case with NH

Hello Todd, Scott, & Deb

Attached is OCSE's opinion on the Strobel and Rosier case, I am available to discuss the document if you

want to talk It over or have  any questions.

Thank you,

Rachel

Rachal Freitas 

Program Specialist . Office of Child Support Enforcement • Region IX

US. Dept, of Health and Human Services

90 7th Street, 9th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94103

(415) 437:6408

(415) 437-8436 ·fax

rachel.freitas@acf.hhs.gov

AZ NH question OCSE final 06112015.docx. ·

 This is in response to your request for guidance to OCSE's Division of Policy and Training (DPT) regarding Arizona's refusal to enforce the support orders referred by New Hampshire to the Arizona IV-D agency in the Strobel-Rosier IV-D case.

On March. 26, 2014, Scott Lekan, Deputy Assistant Director of the Arizona Division of Child Support Services, sent an email to the federal regional office seeking. guidance on the case of Strobel v. Rosier. DPT has reviewed the information forwarded with that e-mail, which Includes copies of orders and correspondence. With the caveat that our review is limited to the information provided to us, we offer the following guidance.

Main Issue

During March 2010 and June 2010 the New Hampshire division of Child Support Services forwarded New Hampshire orders to the Arizona Division of Child Support Services for registration and enforcement. The question that has been raised is whether these orders are Child support orders. The answer Is important for two reasons.1) A Title- 1V-D child support agency receives federal funding to "provide services relating to the establishment of paternity or the establishment, modification, or enforcement of child support obligations." 2) The Uniform Interstate Family Support, Act (UIFSA) and the federal Full Faith and Credit for . Child Support Orders act  (FFCCSOA) governed child support orders. They do not apply to private agreements, which are not enforceable as support orders.

Case History

May 1996. Dominican republicdivorce.. The divorce order identifies one child of the marriage and awards the CP and non-CP joint custody of the child. It is silent regarding child support and parenting.May 2006. NCP filed petition in New Hampshireto "Register Foreign Decree and Establish Parenting Plan."July 2006. NCP submitted a proposed uniform support order. The proposed order stated that "By agreement of the parties, child support is waived in lieu of college contributions.'' The New Hampshire Court did not approved or reject the proposed order. March 2009. In response to CP's. Petition for Motion to Clarify the New Hampshire Court issued an order finding:· When the NCP filed her 2006 petition to register the Dominican republic divorce decree and establish a parenting plan, neither party sought entry of a child support order.· In 1997 the parties agreed that in lieu of paying child support, NCP would pay for the child's college education.· In reliance on that agreement, the CP had not received child support since February 1997.· This agreement is valid and enforceable.The New Hampshire Court ordered the NCP to liquidate her real estate assets in place the funds in an account where they would be available for the child's college expenses. In December 2009 the New Hampshire Court found NCP in contempt for failure to comply with 2009 order. March 2010. New Hampshire issued a uniform support order (using a standardized USO template). 

The order: 

• · Establishes child support arrears of $202,500 as of October 31, 2009
• · requires payment through the New Hampshire division of Child support services.
• · Includes an attached variable payment schedule for the arrears. 

The NCP did not appeal the order.[1]May 2010 CP files a motion to clarify the March 2010 uniform support order. CP requested monthly consistent payments towards the arrears because the New Hampshire division of Child support services had stated it was difficult to collect on arrears with a fluctuating payment schedule.June 2010 New Hampshire Court issues a second uniform support order. This order confirmed child support arrearages of 202,500 and establishes a $10,000/month payment schedule. The NCP did not appeal the order.August 2011 New Hampshire division of Child support services set the Arizona division of Child support services and interstate transmittal number one requesting registration and enforcement of the March 2010 and June 2010 uniform support orders. It alleged that child support arrears were $202,163 as of August 29, 2011. The transmittal also noted that arrearage payment under the orders was $10,000 per month.(based on subsequent actions, it appears that at some point, the NH orders were registered in AZ)March 2014NCP filed a petition in New Hampshire to vacate her obligation Issued In June 2010.April 2014. In response to a motion filed by the Arizona office of the Atty. Gen., and Arizona hearing commissioner entered an order vacating the NCP's court enforcement hearing that had been scheduled for May 22, 2014. "The order authorized the state to file a motion to reset the hearing "if/and when the New Hampshire Court rules on whether the orders in this case are enforceable."May 2014. The New Hampshire's ninth circuit court of the Nashua family division entered an order denying the NCP's motion to vacate the existing orders in the case. Finding that there was no legal or factual basis for vacating the existing orders, it held "the June 21, 2010 court order approving the uniform support order in this matter is an enforceable order on a child support arrearage."[2]The NCP subsequently filed a motion to reconsider and an appeal. August 2014. The Supreme Court of the state of New Hampshire declined the notice of appeal by unanimous vote.[3]February 2015. The Arizona office of Atty. Gen., on behalf of the AZ division of Child support services, sent a letter to private counsel for the CP stating:"The Arizona DCSS has decided to cease enforcement of your clients order because it is a private agreement for payment of college tuition, and not a child support order. [T]he Arizona DCSS believes it is not an IV-D function to enforce a private agreement for payment of college tuition. Calling the agreement a child support order does not make it so, and using the IVD program to collect it is outside the scope of the program, and therefore inappropriate."[4] AnalysisSection 201 of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act Defines A Child Support Order as "a support order for a child". The term "support order" means "a judgment, to me, order, decision, or directive, whether temporary, final, or subject to modification, issued by a tribunal in a state or foreign country for the benefit of a child, a spouse, or a former spouse, which provides for monetary support, healthcare, arrearages, retroactive support, or reimbursement for financial assistance provided to an individual obligate the in place of child support. The term may include related costs and fees, interest, income withholding, automatic adjustment, reasonable attorneys fees, and other relief."The Federal Full Faith And Credit For Child Support Orders Act defines child support order as "a judgment, decree, or order of a court requiring the payment of child support in periodic amounts or in a lump sum." The term "child support," is defined as "a payment of money continuing support, or arrearages or the provision of a benefit (including payment of health insurance, child care, and educational expenses" for the support of a child). 28 U.S.C.§1738B(b).The relevant orders are the March and June 2010 New Hampshire uniform support orders, which are the orders that the New  Hampshire division of child support sought to register for enforcement in Arizona.The orders are titled "uniform support order," and are standardized order forms used by the state of New Hampshirejudicial branch. The heading list the name of the person ordered to pay support (obligor)" and they (name of the person receiving support (obligate)." In the instant case, those names are the NCP and CP respectively. In the space where the order list the name of the "children to whom this order applies," the CP's and the NCP's child is identified. The courts have checked the box open quote this order is a final order." The form orders include tick boxes for issues often addressed in child-support proceedings, such as modification of support pursuant to a three-year review or a substantial change of circumstances. There are two boxes for "child-support" and "spousal support". Under the tick box for child support, the courts in the present case checked the "obligor is ordered to pay arrearage of $202,500 [entered into the blank field] as of "10/31/2009" [entered into the blank field]." In the March 2010 uniform support order, there is a handwritten note, "see proposed order schedule of payment." In the June 2010 uniform support order, the order provides "payable $10,000 per month." Paragraph #5 of the uniform support orders provides that payment shall be made to the division of Child support services. Both courts have checked two boxes related to employment; the first box states "upon employment the obligor shall bring the matter forward for recalculation of support. Failure to do so may result in a recalculated support order effective the date of employment." Incorporated in the uniform support orders is a standing order. Throughout the standing order there are references to child-support. For example, paragraph SO-5D provides "collection by DCSS on any arrearages may include intercepting the obligor's federal tax refund." By using the form uniform support order, the New Hampshirecourts clearly considered their 2010 orders to be child support orders. The orders themselves establish the amount of $202,500 as child support arrearages. The orders meet with the definition of child support under UIFSA: they are orders issued by a state tribunal for the benefit of a child that provide for arrearages. The orders also meet the definition of a child support order under the Federal full faith and credit for child support  orders act. The NCP did not appeal the entry of the orders. Assuming they were entered with personal and subject matter jurisdiction, the orders are entitled to recognition and enforcement by Arizona.[5]Federal regulations at 45 C.F.R. 303.7(d) require a state IV-D responding agency to process and enforce forwarded by an initiating agency. In 2011 the New  Hampshire title IV-D child support agency initiated in intergovernmental case to Arizona, seeking registration and enforcement of the two New   Hampshire child support orders for arrears. Pursuant to federal regulation, the Arizona DCS acid was required to seek enforcement of the orders.Section 606 of UIFSA requires that any challenge to the registration must be raised by the non-registering party. That means that the proper party to challenge the registration is the NCP, not the Arizonachild support agency. UIFSA outlines valid defenses to the registration of a child support order if the NCP does not timely contest the registration in Arizona UIFSA provides that the registered New Hampshire support orders and the allegedly arrears are confirmed by operation of law. Under section 604 of UIFSA, the law of the issuing state governs open quote the computation and payment of arrearages and accrual of interest under the support order."In April 2014, in response to a motion by the Arizona office of the Attorney General, and Arizona Hearing Commissioner issued an order vacating and enforcement hearing on the registered New Hampshire support orders. The order authorizes the state to file a motion to reset the hearing "if and when New Hampshire rules on whether the orders in this case are enforceable." In May 2014, the New Hampshire Court denied the NCP's motion to vacate the earlier New Hampshire uniform support orders. The court held, "the June 21, 2010 court order approving the uniform support order in this matter is an enforceable order on child support arrearage." In August 2014 the New Hampshire Supreme Court declined NCP's notice of appeal.New Hampshire has clearly ruled on whether the orders are enforceable, holding multiple times that they are. In compliance with federal regulations governing intergovernmental IV-D cases, Arizona should reset the case for an enforcement hearing. Conclusionbased on the information we reviewed, it appears that the 2010 New   Hampshire uniform support orders are child-support orders under the definition of UIFSA, and FFCSOA[6], and entitled to recognition and enforcement.The condition precedent to the 2014 Arizonaorder staying in enforcement has not been met. Pursuant to federal regulation, Arizona should request resetting of the hearing for enforcement and proceed with enforcement of the valid New Hampshire child support orders for arrears. [1] The records will reflect that there was no service of this action as required by the NH Rules, and that Catherine Shanelaris's "Certificate of Mailing" of both the 3/11/10 USO as well as the revised USO, was sent to an obsolete address of Rosier's Scottsdale home that was foreclosed upon in 2008 prior to her incarceration, and was a fact well known to both Strobel and Shanelaris, lending credence to intentional chicanery to conceal and deprive Rosier of the knowledge of such contrivance being perpetrated against her.
[2] This statement is true, however, Rosier was represented by ineffectual and incompetent NH counsel, who only asserted the defenses of judicial error of law made by the previous courts in her Motion to Vacate, and could not provide to the court, citation of the law providing for the court's jurisdiction of vacating of the orders. The issues and evidence of fraud and misconduct were neither discovered at that juncture, nor asserted before the court. Nor did the Rosier's ineffectual counsel assert the appropriate legal issues regarding the NH court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of personal jurisdiction., that would render the orders to be void orders under NH law. The discovery of fraud was first asserted in the appeal to the NH Supreme court based upon very limited evidence, however the depth and breadth of the fraudulent scheme and the chicanery perpetrated and orchestrated by Catherine Shanelaris, was not discovered until preparation for the Arizona hearing, upon obtaining evidence that was previously represented by the court clerk as being "unavailable".
[3] While this is true, the NH Supreme Court's declination of this case was based on Petitioner's "untimely filing" of the Rule 7A Request for Appeal, which denial was pursuant to the NH Supreme Court Rule 1(b) which states: "Such an appeal shall be filed by the moving party within 30 days from the date on the clerk's written notice of the decision on the merits". Additionally, both the NH DCSS and Federal OCSE and Rachael Freitas to use the declination by the Supreme Court to hear her appeal, as rationale and evidence for diminishing or dismissing Rosier's merits regarding fraud and misconduct, is misguided, prejudicial, and violates the intent of specific Rule 3 of the NH Rules of the Supreme Court, which states:"Declination of acceptance order": The supreme court does not deem it desirable to review the issues in a case, as a matter of sound judicial discretion and with no implication whatever regarding its views on the merits."IF the denial of Rosier's "Motion for Reconsideration" was based on a substantive or meritorious issue, the date of the court's NOD ("Notice of Decision') of June 9, 2014 (or the receipt of which of June 11, 2014), would have allowed the NH Supreme Court to consider Rosier's case on it's merits-- including the newly proffered assertion of fraud. If the Notice of Appeal were filed within 30 days of the NOD, or based on the date of the court's ruling made on Rosier's "Motion for Reconsideration", or 30 days from the NOD would render a filing deadline of July 9th, 2014, a date that was complied with by Rosier's filing of her Rule 7(A) Appeal on July 7th, 2014. However, the courts ruling on Rosier's "Motion to Vacate...." was issued by the court on May 7th, 2014, and received by Rosier's counsel on May 9th, 2014. Rosier's counsel filed her "Motion for Reconsideration" on the last day of the deadline-- June 19th, however in the wrong court (Merrimack-- rather than Nashua) as evidenced by the date of the document (and a confirmation email to Rosier stating that the Motion had been filed within the deadline) HOWEVER the court index reveals the date of entry of Rosier's "Motion for Reconsideration" as logged into the court records as May 20th, 2014-- tardy and consequently untimely by one day.  Once the "Motion for Consideration" was untimely, it was no longer considered on it's merits, but only on it's non-compliance with civil procedure and "denied on June 9, 2014 due to Rule 1.26(F)", and became a moot action that would have been, and was disallowed as well by the NH Supreme Court, resetting the appeal filing clock automatic reverting to the 30 days from the original NOD date (May 9th 2014).This would have caused Rosier's deadline date to file a Rule 7(A) Discretionary Appeal, to comply with NH Supreme Court Rule 1(b)-- to be 30 days from the NOD denying her original Motion to Vacate on May 9, 2004, to be 30 days hence, or June 9th, 2014. Such deadline was unknown to Rosier at such time as she was preparing the pro se appeal, and due to the lack of candor and concealment in revealing the reason by her own counsel, they did not disclose their own error, and the resultant consequences.
[4] This was a correct and accurate analysis of this case. The Arizona DCSS was unable to establish an original child support order, nor did Strobel ever seek the establishment of any order. This is established in the court's 3-11-2009 undisputed and unchallenged determination, which stands today as the controlling order. The Arizona DCSS did not need to prove fraud and misconduct to define HOW Strobel was able to procure a void and illegal retroactive child support order, just that it was not enforceable, and the issue was therefore a private agreement for a child's future college education funding.
[5] This is the fatal flaw of this analysis. It is incumbent for the Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement to investigate this case-- not just to simply provide a superficial and perfunctory analysis of the documentation as it relates to the UIFSA. The Arizona Attorney General's office had already arrived at the correct and appropriate evaluation: that this was a private agreement between the parties that was not a UIFSA issue, and as well, the 3-9-10 USO was defective [and void] because there was no underlying original or valid child support order, as was established by the NH court on 3-11-09.Why then, did Ms. Frietas'' evaluation performed on behalf of a U.S. Government agency, not further explore this obvious discrepancy? Why would Ms. Frietas simply stake the efficacy of her report on assumptions, and a reliance on information provided to her by an agency (the NH DCSS) who has a demonstrateable conflict-of-interest with their relationship with Catherine Shanelaris-- their former chief counsel, and their pecuniary interest in receiving very substantial Federal funding Ms. Upon Rosier's discovery of the contrivance levied against her in NH by the in-court acceptance of service of a registration package deficient of requisite documents- such as the USO, Ms. Rosier retained counsel in NH to acquire all the relevant court documents, and ascertained that there was rampant fraud, misconduct, and abuse of process.Ms. Frietas also perpetuates the mantra and platform of Jeffrey Strobel, by casting it in concrete as if it were fact, without any consideration of reviewing the original arrangement between the parties by stating what amounts to disinformation, and discrimination of Rosier, whereby she above stated:"In reliance on that agreement, the CP had not received child support since February 1997"This is like "re-tweeting a patently false tweet" (something that is in the current mainstream news cycle).A review of the only document which is the basis of the arrangement between Strobel and Rosier, will reveal (in Strobel's own words that he would indemnify Rosier against child support in return for "keeping the custody arrangement the way it [was] , which Rosier complied with for nine years-- until she moved to Arizona, and Strobel denied her their son's visitation. The contribution to the son's college fund was optional, and is the essence of a case now before the U.S. 9thDistrict Court of Appeals. that neither Ms. Frietas nor the NH Courts have EVER reviewed the original agreement-- if it could even be called an agreement, but presume to accept Strobel's assertion as being correct. When Rosier admitted to the court that she had a college investment for her son, the courts only presumed that she was obligated to do so. If anyone were to read the original offer from Strobel to Rosier, his language is clear and unmistakable as prefacing her option with the word "IF", and stating that such investment was at her option. Thanks to the negligence of the NH courts, the interpretation of this arrangement was never heard or considered as a contract, and yet, RSA 461-A:14, V specifically deprives the court of Subject Matter Jurisdiction in the enforceability of any contract for future college expenses. The offer from Strobel, was in Ms. Rosier agreeing to, and not contesting his sole custody of their son, in return for his indemnification of never seeking child support. The Arizona Attorney General's Office placed a reliance on the U.S. OCSE's flawed and discriminatory analysis, and the OSCE had the obligation to get it right and perform a comprehensive analysis on the case-- not to be presumptive of Rosier's obligation, and make assumptions that the State of NH followed the proper procedures, when there is the possibility of official misconduct in their association and their incestuous relationship and questionable dealings with Catherine Shanelaris, in their desire to maximize Federal grant revenues, or in this case, to not jeopardize the status of their Federal OCSE funding-- which Msd. Frietas under the paragraph entitled "Main Issues" above, states:'1) A Title- 1V-D child support agency receives federal to "provide services relating to theestablishment of paternity or the establishment, modification, or enforcement of child support obligations." 'Rosier in her Answer To Petition To Enforce Support filed with the Arizona court on January 14, 2014, she made allegations of fraud , misconduct, lack of service and as variety of other abuses. Without Rosier being in full possession of all the documents, and the inter-agency dealings, she still was not aware of the whole picture of the abuses any collaboration of the NH DCSS with Catherine Shanelarias, the abuse of process and (continued bottom of next page...) ....discrimination against her by the courts, the denial of due process, and numerous violations of her own constitutional rights. Because of the procedural time constraints, as a fraudulent contrivance orchestrated by both Strobel, as well as his counsel, had yet to be fully exposed, Ms. Rosier had only uncovered a few pieces of the puzzle, and in her correspondence with Ms. Janet Sells, the investigator for the Arizona Attorney General's office, she was only able to elaborate on what was apparently fraudulent. it was incumbent upon the Federal OSCE to thoroughly examine the entire case. There are glaring irregularities, as well as obvious prima facie errors- i.e. the NH Court finding on 3/11/09 that there had never been a child support order issued. That does not allow a family court or the DCSS, or the OSCE to go back retroactively, and reinterpret, overturn, modify, or vacate any court finding and/or determination that the court had jurisdiction to make, without the legally proscribed due process and procedures in New Hampshire. None were complied with on March 9th, 2010, including issuing an initial child support for an offspring that has already reached the age of majority.
[6] This is an erroneous conclusion, and all orders subsequent to the March 11th 2009 findings, lacked personal jurisdiction (as there was NEVER any legal process for seeking or establishing child support), and the court's subject matter jurisdiction which violated RSA 461-A:14, V, and the NH Supreme Court's decision in Re: Goulart, as well as long standing legal precepts of issuing a child support order retroactively AFTER a child reaches the age of majority, or without due process of law, which is unconstitutional.  Therefore, the NH Orders are arbitrary, and by definition void orders, and do not comport with UIFSA and FFCSOA.Rosier's  

At what point would Ms. Frietas, or any investigator begin to have suspicions of fraud and misconduct?    What would it take?  A claim of $500,000 of arrearages, maybe $1 million. or would these functionaries simply go along with the fraudulent scheme without questioning any of it.  

Ms. Frietas uses a conclusive word " establishes" to describe fraudulents fraudulent order.  This fraudulent and contrived that was turned over to Shanelaris  by the court , bore no resemblance to any reality, nor was Strobel or Shanelaris ever held responsible for justifying the artifice--- with one exception

Establishes means to provide proof, evidence, or documentation. Shanelaris indicates her calculating and deviant intent... especially in using several bequeaths of $7,000  made by  by R.Peter Rosier to each of Gail's children.