New Hampshire Injustice

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  • Home
  • NH's Financial Crisis
  • UIFSA Declining an Order
  • Subj. Matter Jurisdction
  • March 10, 2010 Hearing
  • Conflation or Fraud?
  • Strobel's Custody (1997)
  • The Investment Property
  • Criminal Travesty
  • TheHopkington MA Property
  • Dedication
  • Connor Photo Gallery
  • Turner Rogers & the OSCE
  • Parole 2010
  • AZ-AG Determination
  • 2009-11-05 Status Confe.
  • Judge John Berry
  • Appendix
  • Shanelaris (Misc)
  • Court Transcripts
  • More
    • Home
    • NH's Financial Crisis
    • UIFSA Declining an Order
    • Subj. Matter Jurisdction
    • March 10, 2010 Hearing
    • Conflation or Fraud?
    • Strobel's Custody (1997)
    • The Investment Property
    • Criminal Travesty
    • TheHopkington MA Property
    • Dedication
    • Connor Photo Gallery
    • Turner Rogers & the OSCE
    • Parole 2010
    • AZ-AG Determination
    • 2009-11-05 Status Confe.
    • Judge John Berry
    • Appendix
    • Shanelaris (Misc)
    • Court Transcripts

New Hampshire Injustice

New Hampshire InjusticeNew Hampshire InjusticeNew Hampshire Injustice
  • Home
  • NH's Financial Crisis
  • UIFSA Declining an Order
  • Subj. Matter Jurisdction
  • March 10, 2010 Hearing
  • Conflation or Fraud?
  • Strobel's Custody (1997)
  • The Investment Property
  • Criminal Travesty
  • TheHopkington MA Property
  • Dedication
  • Connor Photo Gallery
  • Turner Rogers & the OSCE
  • Parole 2010
  • AZ-AG Determination
  • 2009-11-05 Status Confe.
  • Judge John Berry
  • Appendix
  • Shanelaris (Misc)
  • Court Transcripts

Strobel's Conflation of College Tuition as Child Support, or

  • Since 2004, the New Hampshire family courts lacked authority to order a parent to pay for college expenses, with the exception of enforcing orders and agreements made prior to 2004. As it was written then, RSA 461‐A:14 (V) provided that “no child support order shall require a parent to contribute to an adult child's college expenses or other educational expenses beyond the completion of high school.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court later held in Goulart that the family court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to approve an agreement between to parents for the payment of college expenses.


  • Whether the 2006 USO  used the language "...in lieu of", or "waived" or any other verb, Gail's financial form stating that in her assets, the investment in a partnership the rental property in Hopkington Massachusetts, was reserved for Connor's college tuition.  While she notated that the investment was in lieu of child support, that was a contemporaneous  representation hastily and inaccurately noted, without going into a lengthy explanation of the unique circumstances  of how and why Strobel obtained custody of his son. The financial entry is simply not an admission nor a fair representation of the extent or entirety of the arrangement.


  • Strobel neither provided a copy of the original 1997 agreement, nor did the Judge Forrest consider the content of the agreement in his 3-11-2008 NOD, incorrectly presuming that his judicial authority to rule on the absent 1997 agreement, but that it could override the lack of subject matter jurisdiction  deprived by RSA 461‐A:14 (V).


  • Gail Rosier was innocently wrong about her incomplete and inaccurate off-handed recollection of the exact arrangement made in 1997, when recounting it nine (9) years later. Her misrepresentation of her memory was inconsequential at that time, and not a matter of child support-- as none was sought by either party.  Gail, not understanding the ramifications and potential consequence at the hands of her vindictive ex-husband  between an casual remark, and a legal statement.  Gail did not take her commitment to her son's education lightly, however Catherine Shanelaris used smoke and mirrors deception to concoct a scenario of the college funds contribution as an alternative for child-support, and therefore to be treated as child support.  


  • It is NOT an "either-or" child support substitute-- and Catherine Shanelaris knows this, and that she is conflating the two.  She has also read the  3-13-09 Decision and Order , 



  • The only evidence of any legal consequence pertaining to this case, is the exact transcript or written arrangement relied upon by Gail, who made a reliance on Strobel's exact language in the proposal:  
     

The waiver granted is absolute, and permanent and immutable: 

" l would like to propose the following - that we keep the current custody arrangement and that you no longer are obliged to pay child support."

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  • Judge Forest's NOD order dated March 16, 2009, was specific, and didn't mince words.  In the transcript, he pointedly asked Strobel about the 1997 agreement (or "arrangement"), and Strobel was evasive and disingenuous.  While Judge Forrest should have never ruled on a contract that he had never seen nor had the opportunity to review, it was a moot point anyway.  


  • What he ruled on in his 3-17-08  NOD , however, was not child support, as he established:
  • "... that there had never been a child support order in this, or any other court."

File coming soon.

Strobel's 1997 proposal & quid-pro-quo

  • This is the cornerstone 1997 quid-pro-quo"arrangement" between Strobel and Rosier.  Strobel, playing lawyer-- never followed this up with a written agreement... this was it!


  • Facially, it is determinable that Strobel's proposal (which was accepted by Rosier), did not use language such as "waiver", or "in lieu of".  He bestowed blanket immunity to Rosier from future child support, in return for her not instituting a legal challenge to his custody of Connor, as he already enjoyed legal custody due to unrevealed personal circumstances. 


"l would like to propose the following - that we keep the current custody arrangement 

and that you no longer are obliged to pay child support"


  • Thereafter is the suggestion that with the money the both of them set aside, then they could  contribute to Connor's college education.  


  • Furthermore, in reading this crucial piece of communication that was conveniently suppressed and conflated by Strobel, he grant's Rosier total discretion with the use of the funds.  


There was  a lot of water under the bridge between this March 1997 arrangement, and 2006 when Conner was 16, Gail had moved to Arizona, and Strobel was obstructing Connor's visitation with his her because he would have to fly ther as an unaccompanied minor.  Strobels intransigence and obstinacy necessitated the parents to enter their Dominican divorce into the New Hampshire courts for mediation. 


For Strobel some 9 years hence, the bloom was off the rose, and the financial responsibility for raising his son, became a reality.  He was now out for blood... Gail's blood, and especially since she  was then married to an affluent doctor, and paid many of Connor's expenses and bought him clothes,  electronics, etc. Whatever Gail may have purchased for Connor during his visitations at her home in Southborough Mass,  the envious, controlling  and vindictive Strobel would not allow Connor to bring anything home with him that Gail had purchased for him.   


  • Below, is the cornerstone arrangement, the details of which Strobel misrepresented to the court at the March 11th hearing, and continued to deceptively  misrepresent throughout the proceedings.  

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March 9, 2009 Hearing & 3-11-09 Decision

  • Although not having the above cornerstone document concealed by Strobel, and overlooked by the court, Judge Forrest did issue his decision and order.  


  • The criminal elements violating  RSA 641:2  and/or  RSA 641:3  


  • The NOD below needs to be clarified:


  • It states that "there has never been a child support order in this, or any other state";


  • It deduces from Rosier's inaccurate and hasty statement financial affidavit that the quid-pro-quo was  Strobel's waiver of child support in exchange for the college tuition.  It is clear from the foregoing that there were additional stipulations contained in the quid pro quo that were opaque and not made available to the court by Strobel- specifically the discretionary powers Strobel granted her..  


  • The court's conclusion "...[B]ased upon the foregoing, the Court finds that the parties' agreement in 1997, that in lieu of child support, Ms. Rosier would "save" money to be used to pay Connor's college educational expenses is valid and enforceable. The Court enters the following specific orders:   1. Ms. Rosier shall immediately take all necessary steps to liquidate the real estate asset which is being held for the benefit of Connor's college educational expenses, and to ensure that the funds will be available for this purpose.


  • Although arriving at a faulty conclusion due to Strobel's concealment and misleading statement, and deprived of subject matter jurisdiction by  RSA 461‐A:14 (V), whether or not the court concluded that the trade-off was the cessation of child support  in return for the college fund, it lacks legal authority  unilaterally award  child support retroactively.  


  • The court ordered the liquidation of the investment-- which is neither child support, nor a monetary award... it is an order for Rosier to take an action to to liquidate the investment, and make a report to Strobel  of whatever unspecified funds that might become available .  


  • The legality of this order is debatable, but what is unquestionable, is that the order  does  not constitute a child support order, nor contains any such language inferring that it does. 


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